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Statutory interpretation is surely one of the most crucial legal questions today and
has accordingly received considerable attention from academics and judges. This article
examines the past analyses with a new perspective and, most importantly, new
quantitative empirical evidence. The theory and practice of statutory interpretation has
been the subject of some excellent academic analyses over the years on which I will draw
extensively.1 Unfortunately, these analyses have focused almost exclusively upon
theoretical matters, with little regard for the actual practice of statutory interpretation,
save for use of anecdotal supporting examples.2 However fine a theory may be, it has
little real value outside its operationalization. A theory that cannot effectively be put into
judicial practice has little value and may even produce perverse consequences. Empirical
analysis is necessary to evaluate the operationalization of the theories. Empirical analysis
is important in other ways as well. The theories of statutory interpretation inevitably rely
upon certain descriptive presumptions that should be empirically tested.
The purpose of the empirical analysis of this article is to answer several very
important questions that have plagued the academic dispute over statutory interpretation:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Do the justices of the Supreme Court faithfully adhere to particular theories of
statutory interpretation?
Which theories of statutory interpretation tend to be favored by particular
justices of the Supreme Court
Do the justices of the Supreme Court reach ideologically preferred results,
regardless of particular theories of statutory interpretation?
Do certain theories of statutory interpretation tend to produce results
consistent with a particular ideology?
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5.

Do certain theories of statutory interpretation constrain justices and prevent
them from reaching their ideologically preferred outcome?

All of these questions are vital to understanding the theory and practice of statutory
interpretation in the Supreme Court. The answer to the fifth question is the primary
focuse of the article and perhaps the most critical, at least if we believe that Supreme
Court decisions should be grounded in law, rather than the political predispositions of
particular justices.
The first section of the article examines the underlying purposes of statutory
interpretation, as it is difficult to evaluate differing positions with understanding the
purposes they purport to achieve. While there has been much debate over the goals of the
interpretive process, I argue that the most basic and crucial goal is the rule of law and that
any methods of statutory interpretation must be evaluated in light of how it is applied – as
a disciplined means of interpretation or as a cloak to further the ideological policy ends of
the judiciary. If the interpretive method is but a cloak, it cannot advance the more
principled ends that it claims to further.
The second section of the article reviews the methodologies of statutory
interpretation and the critical analyses of those theories. I examine textualism, reliance
on legislative intent, and use of the canons of interpretation, all of which have both
defenders and critics. The criticisms of the theories commonly invoke the concern for
ideological judging, as much of the debate has revolved around whether particular
methods are disciplined tools for interpretation or are simply convenient tools for justices
who are advancing their ideologies.
The third section of the article reports the quantitative empirical analysis, testing
the approaches to statutory interpretation. The study measures the degree to which
justices voted ideologically and their relative commitments to different theories of
statutory interpretation. The ideological and legal variables are incorporated into a single
multiple regression, to determine if and the degree to which legal principles of statutory
interpretation can constrain justices from exercising their ideological preferences about
statutory policy. The results are significant and contrary to what is commonly claimed.
Textualism showed no power to constrain the justices, while there was evidence that
principles of pragmatism and legislative constraint were constraining.
I.

The Purpose of Statutory Interpretation

Before assessing statutory interpretation, it is vital to understand its purpose.
Practices cannot be evaluated in the abstract, without some end or purpose that they are
meant to fulfill. Historically, there has been some dispute between those who believe
judges should strive to hew closely to their assessment of legislative intent based on all
available evidence and those who argue that judges should interpret statutes according to
their internal language and eschew extrinsic indicators of legislative intent. Today, the
traditional theories are complemented by those who argue that judges should take a
pragmatic and consequentialist view when interpreting statutes and complicated by a
greater understanding of the ideological influences on judicial decisionmaking. Each of
these theories calls for consideration of different tools. Before evaluating those tools, the
purposes of statutory interpretation must be evaluated.

A.

The Theoretical Purposes of Statutory Interpretation

One asserted purpose of statutory interpretation is the assessment of legislative
intent. This position views judges as the faithful fiduciaries of the enacting legislature,
resolving controversies as that legislature would have chosen, had it understoo d the facts
of the controversies.3 In the early days of our republic, Chief Justice Marshall embraced
this theory.4 “Most of the prominent treatises . . . invoke the intent of Congress as the
interpretive guide.”5 Over the intervening centuries, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed
this objective for statutory interpretation.6 This legislative agency purpose is often
associated with the use of legislative history, though that is not an inevitable association.
Many who are truly devoted to legislative intent interpretation rely on what might
be called “imaginative reconstruction,”7 an approach set forth by Learned Hand, among
others.8 In this process a judge “should try to think his way as best he can into the minds
of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to
the case at bar.”9 This process involves investigation of “the language and apparent
purpose of the statute, its background and structure, its legislative history (especially the
committee reports and the floor statements of the sponsors), and the bearing of related
statutes,” among other factors.10
A common question about the legislative intent objective involves the ability of
courts to identify and implement the legislative purpose. Thus, “judges might mistake
legislative purposes” or “might, by treating statutes flexibly, be purchasing case-specific
benefits at the price of increased uncertainty.”11 This attempt to discern the legislature’s
3
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intent for resolution of a particular case can be daunting in practice.12 Searching for
legislative purpose, it is argued, is a futile endeavor. Even if courts could effectively
implement legislative purpose, some argue that this should not be the goal of statutory
interpretation.
Another possible purpose of statutory interpretation is simply the “rule of law,”
with the “law” based on the language of the text of the statute itself. Those devoted to
this purpose of statutory interpretation will be disinclined to use the legislative history or
purpose of the statute and seek to draw interpretative guidance directly from the statutory
text. The statutory text is the law, not the legislative history.13 For some, including
Justice Scalia, the “intent” of the legislature is not the touchstone of statutory
interpretation, judicial decisions should be limited to the text of the law. Textualists
“rejects the faithful agent model and instead adopts a model of courts as autonomous
interpreters who seek answers to questions of statutory meaning through application of
the ordinary reader perspective, supplemented by various judge-made rules of
interpretation.”14 Only the text itself has “gone through the constitutionally specified
procedures for the enactment of law.”15 Consequently, the argument goes, only the text
itself is suited to judicial interpretation. In this view, the legislature’s role is not to enact
some broad policy intent, its role is to “pass statutes.”16 The only constitutional
legislative authority of Congress is to enact specific laws, through constitutionally
specified procedures.
While the legislative agency theory seems especially deferential to Congress as an
institutional matter, those dedicated to rule of law textualism are arguably more dedicated
to legislative supremacy. The statutory text itself, and not legislative history, is the
product of the full legislature. The process of seeking out an extratextual legislative
purpose may depart from the true wishes of the enacting Congress, while relying on the
text alone might seem a surer guide to the legislature’s intent.
The debate over legislative purpose vs. textualism has lasted for many decades.
The Supreme Court has intermittently cycled between focus on the two different purposes
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at different times.17 While either legislative purpose or textualism has become ascendant
for a time period, neither has knocked out the competing theory. Although the ends of
the two theories seem inconsistent, they have coexisted for much of the American history
of statutory interpretation. The debate between the two approaches shows no sign of
imminent resolution.
Yet a third purpose of statutory interpretation advanced in recent years is a
pragmatic “best policy” standard, sometimes called practical reason. The pragmatists
view the judiciary as a partner in the nation’s governance, capable of making independent
determinations of sound policy or even correcting biases in the legislative process. Thus,
pragmatism clearly rejects the legislative agency theory of statutory interpretation.
Justice Holmes, in his devotion to legislative supremacy, famously wrote: “if my fellow
citizens want to go to Hell I will help them.”18 For the modern pragmatist, this
conclusion is not self-evident. Perhaps judges should play a role in protecting the
citizenry from “going to Hell.” While pragmatism may be informed by statutory text or
legislative history, neither is a dispositive source of interpretation, and a pragmatist judge
will look to the societal consequences of different interpretations before choosing one.19
Contemporary pragmatism is most closely associated with Richard Posner. He argues
that our judges may be considered “wise elders” to whom we may entrust discretionary
judgments.20 Such judges may use their own discretion to adopt a prudent ruling on the
interpretation of contested statutory terms.21
Employing judges as pragmatic partners in governance has some theoretical
advantages. A legislating body can at best create broad and general rules, based on
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inevitably limited information at the time it acts.22 Courts see those rules in application
in particular cases and controversies.23 In consequence, judges witness how the law
works in practice, and where it fails to work. As litigation proceeds, judges accumulate
additional knowledge about a law’s functioning, and they also have an institutional
position enabling them to adapt the law to differing circumstances and, at least in theory,
optimize its effects.
Some have claimed other institutional pragmatic advantages for judicial
decisionmaking. The courts “independence and their deliberative capacities” allegedly
give them “significant advantages over a legislature that may be influenced by parochial
interests and is frequently responsive to monetary demands.”24 There are degrees of
pragmatism. At the extreme, some have suggested that the judiciary essentially rescind
statutes that no longer make sense.25 Pragmatism does not compel such a conclusion, as
judicial rescission of statutes might not be very pragmatic as a general procedural matter.
Pragmatists reject legislative agency theory, which reduces judges to mere
functionaries and which ignores the great difficulties of discerning particularized
legislative intents.. Pragmatists may accept or reject rule of law textualism, depending on
the circumstances and the pragmatic consequences of such an approach.26 For
interpretive purposes, pragmatists would reject the dispositive rule of any of the
traditional interpretive theories regarding text or legislative history, though either could
be relevant.27 Pragmatism does not inevitably conflict with intent or textualist theories.
A formalist text-based interpretive standard may even be the most pragmatic, once one
considers the institutional limitations of the judiciary in ascertaining the pragmatic rule
on a case-by- case basis.28 Such a pragmatic case-by-case approach may be challenged as
transforming judges into legislators and introducing an “unacceptable amount of
22
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uncertainty . . . into the interpretive system.”29 A pragmatic approach relies not on
“deductive logic” but on a “less structured problem-solving process involving common
sense, respect for precedent, and an appreciation of society’s needs.”30
The above discussion makes clear that pragmatism is somewhat amorphous and
therefore an uncertain guide to decisionmaking. By its nature, the theory permits
considerable judicial discretion. Pragmatism is not clearly associated with any
interpretive methodology, though some rules might be associated with pragmatism. The
rule against absurd consequences, for example, is a longstanding pragmatic standard. A
rule giving deference to the legal interpretation of administrative agencies might also be
associated with pragmatism; such a rule is clearly inconsistent with both legislative
agency and textualist theories.
While generally concerned a modern theory, pragmatism has traditional
underpinnings. American judges have in some sense “been pragmatists when it comes to
interpreting statutes,” for “most of our history.”31 The legal process school suggested
that “courts should attempt to ‘make sense’ of regulatory statutes or to treat them as
would ‘reasonable people acting reasonably.’”32 Reliance on judicial “wise elders” to
make sense of statutes, as applied to particular controversies, seems closely akin to
contemporary theories of pragmatism. As a particular example of pragmatism, Cass
Sunstein has urged that courts interpret statutes so as to promote consistency and
coherence among regulatory programs and consider the systemic effects of a given
interpretation.33
The currently controversial theory of dynamic statutory interpretation might be
considered a branch of pragmatism.34 In contrast to the other theories, dynamic statutory
interpretation began as a largely descriptive matter, though it is normative as well.
Descriptively, the theory suggests that courts will attend to the preferences of the
contemporaneous legislature and society, not just the preferences of the enacting
legislature, when interpreting statutes. Normatively, the theory approaches pragmatism
in suggesting that judges can and will update statutes with an intelligent adaptation to the
contemporaneous circumstances, both factual and legal.
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Considerable debate has transpired over the proper ends of statutory
interpretation. Advocates for the various purposes have argued vigorously. The
advocacy, though, has been largely theoretical and, perhaps for that reason, has not
produced much resolution. Thesis and antithesis have struggled, with little synthesis.
The introduction of more pragmatic theories of statutory interpretation has clouded the
waters still further. Relatively little of the debate has been grounded in judicial practice,
though the study of such practice should be crucial to the competing theories.
B.

The Significance of Ideological Judging

The theoretical controversy over the purpose of statutory interpretation is
compounded considerably by the prospect of ideological biases in judicial
decisionmaking. Political scientists have done extensive research on these biases. The
most comprehensive and best known analysis of this effect was by Segal and Spaeth.35
They have extensively studied Supreme Court decisionmaking, using an expansive
database, and produced empirical results demonstrating the importance of a justice’s
ideology to decisionmaking. Indeed, they argue that legal factors “serve only to
rationalize the Court’s decisions and to cloak the reality of the Court’s decisionmaking
process.”36 Segal and Spaeth’s claims are bolstered by considerable additional empirical
evidence.37 The evidence that judges are at least influenced by their ideological
predispositions is now compelling, and the effect of ideology is most pronounced at the
Supreme Court level. This conclusion has important implications for statutory
interpretation.
The findings of empirical regularities, characterized as ideological judging, do not
necessarily yield conclusions about the internal thought processes or intentions of the
justices. While ideological decisionmaking may reflect the oft-criticized practice of
judicial willfulness, it could somewhat more innocently demonstrate nothing more than
subconscious motivated reasoning.38 The empirical researchers are generally agnostic on
35
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the explanation for the ideological pattern of outcomes. If the effect is subconscious, it
might be restrained by clear legal directives to the contrary. Even a conscious bias might
be so constrained. The key issue is, therefore, what legal principles or methods best
restrain ideological decisionmaking.39
For some linguistic extremists, like critical legal studies devotees, any attempt to
constrain judicial ideology is hopeless. Those who challenge the constraining power of
language surely carry a measure of truth. If language were perfectly constraining on
judges, they would never disagree or dissent and there would be no discernible significant
pattern to their individual decisions. However, language may still be relatively
constraining. One may dispute whether a tiger is within the definition of “cat,” but few
could place a dachshund within that definition, even if they so desired.
While some researchers suggest that the law has no effect and perhaps can have
no effect on Supreme Court rulings, others contend that the law may have an effect and
ameliorate ideological decisionmaking.40 If legal standards can affect outcomes and
avoid ideological manipulation of outcomes, it is important to understand what sort of
standards may have that effect. The importance of this understanding may be particularly
important for matters of statutory interpretation.
Many traditional theories of statutory interpretation have at least implicitly relied
on a presumption that judges are not ideologically biased in their decisionmaking. Thus,
once judges accept whether legislative history is an appropriate guide to statutory
interpretation, the theories presume that they will all apply that guide faithfully and
uniformly, without being influenced by ideological biases in its application. The
recognition that judges may be ideologically influenced guides the proper approach to
statutory interpretation. Reliance on legislative history, it has been claimed, is
particularly susceptible to ideological bias.41 Constraining judicial ideology is one of the
explicit projects of textualism.42 However, the textualists have produced little actual
evidence that their interpretive approach constrains willful decisionmaking.
The appreciation of ideology and judicial decisionmaking leads us to a fourth
fundamental purpose for statutory interpretation rules – the constraint of such ideological
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judicial choice.43 While some component of judicial ideology is not necessarily a bad
thing,44 the scope of ideological decisionmaking must be somehow cabined.45 Giving
free range to judicial ideology defeats all of the plausible theoretical goals of statutory
interpretation. A judiciary that effects its own ideological ends cannot be a faithful
fiduciary of the ideological ends of the enacting legislature. An ideological judiciary will
not reliably advance the rule of law, because the same law will be interpreted differently
by judges of different ideologies. Judicial ideology also undermines pragmatic
decisionmaking, because the goal of pragmatism is not to aggrandize a particular judge’s
liberal or conservative ideology but rather to reach decisions that broadly benefit the
society. Whatever the ultimate objective of statutory interpretation, ideological
decisionmaking should be constrained.
In the presence of judicial ideology, the optimal method of statutory interpretation
might be the theoretically “second best” method. For example, suppose that the
legislative agent theory of search for intent was deemed the theoretically optimal
interpretive method. However, suppose that in practice the use of this method did not
sincerely rely upon true legislative intent but was only a mask for the judges’ own
ideological preferences. Use of the method would fail to advance and could easily
undermine the goal of the method. In this scenario, a theoretically suboptimal
interpretive method that constrained the use of judicial ideology could better approach the
objective. Some arguments for textual interpretation make precisely this case, that the
textual method is a more objective and constraining guide to judicial decisionmaking.
Enhancing the relative constraint imposed by statutes may be the key project of
theories of statutory interpretation.46 If language has some constraining power,
textualism might seem the best interpretive approach for avoiding ideological bias. Its
devotees claim that that the theory “provides legal certainty, predictability and
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objectivity.”47 This result is typically contrasted with the arguably more discretionary
practice of reliance on legislative history. Reliance on the “ordinary meaning” of text
supposedly enables diverse ideologies to reach consensus.48 Indeed, this rationale for
textualism is often presented and may be the truest defense of the practice.49
Unfortunately, this claim is oft-asserted but never proved. Some suggest that a “claimed
reliance on the text often disguises the actual basis for decision, which does not turn on
text at all.”50
Pragmatism and dynamic statutory interpretation might seem especially
vulnerable to the effects of ideological bias. The philosophical notion of pragmatism can
be neutral ideologically, represented by those from Rorty on the left to Quine on the
right.51 The ability of individuals to force all sorts of ideological approaches into
47
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pragmatism, though, indicates that the theory of pragmatism is not very constraining.
Pragmatism might be called “playing tennis with the net down,” in its unrestrictive
nature. As such, the theory might seem especially susceptible to ideological
manipulation. Critics have questioned “its compatibility with the rule of law.”52
Dynamic statutory interpretation has been called “excessively expansive” in providing
judicial discretion, establishing “the judiciary as a largely unaccountable ruling elite.”53
Ultimately, though, the effect of pragmatic theories of interpretation is an empirical
question. It is even plausible that pragmatism might reduce ideological judicial
decisionmaking, because its policy orientation is more transparent and eliminates the
judge’s ability to hide ideology behind a neutral principal of choice. 54
Arguably, the contrasting theories about the purpose of statutory interpretation are
not wholly incompatible. A judge could be a “pluralist” who chooses the most
appropriate theory for a particular case. Such an approach could be the most theoretically
appealing, as students of the legislative process have suggested that different approaches
might suit different statutes.55 The theoretical ideal, though, need not be the best
approach in practice. The ideal assumes that judges are capable of discerning which
approach fits which statute, an assumption that may be unrealistic. In practice, the
pluralist approach has resulted in “unpredictability and confusion,” as “it has become
ever more difficult to predict which judge will apply which theory to which case.”56 In
consequence, some have argued that rule of law values demand that judges settle on a
particular interpretive regime, regardless of what that regime is.57
The ideal of precise pluralist interpretation also unrealistically assumes that
judges are perfectly sincere in their devotion to the most accurate interpretation and not
influenced by their personal ideological policy preferences. The current existence of
pluralist theories about the purpose of statutory interpretation, and their associated tools,
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are quite convenient for ideologically minded judges.58 The more different tools that
judges may call upon in interpretation, the greater their discretion. If a text seems liberal,
but the legislative history takes a more conservative position, a conservative judge can
focus on legislative history to reach a conservative result. When the text is conservative
and the legislative history liberal, the same conservative judge might emphasize the text.
Hence, the continued controversy itself facilitates willful orideological judging.
Even if a given theory of statutory interpretation is accepted as the theoretically
preferred purpose for the endeavor, that conclusion does not resolve the issue of how
statutes should be interpreted. While certain purposes are typically associated with
certain rules of interpretation (i.e., legislative intent with the use of legislative history),
that association is always presumed, rather than proved. Textualists may argue that their
approach is actually more consistent with the furtherance of legislative intent. The more
appropriate focus is on the effect of particular rules of interpretation, rather than the airier
debate over the ultimate purposes of interpretation.
With the purpose of statutory interpretation and the significance of ideological
decisionmaking as backdrop, this article will proceed to examine the theory and practice
of judicial decisionmaking, with a focus on interpretive methods. Judges may not always
disclose their ultimate purpose but they do justify their decisions through particular legal
methods. The following section analyzes those methods, their justifications, and their
common criticisms.
II.

The Methods of Statutory Interpretation

There are three central potential tools for statutory interpretation. The first is the
statutory text itself. The text-centered approach seeks to glean the answers to litigated
disputes from the words of the statute itself. The second approach involves the use of
legislative history. In this approach, the text is supplemented by a consideration of
various legislative materials developed in the course of the bill’s passage, in order to
discern a legislative intent for the litigated dispute. The third approach uses canons of
construction or heuristics for giving meaning to a statute. Some canons are linguistic,
akin to the rules of grammar, while others are substantive presumptions. The three
approaches are not inherently antagonistic to one another, but the typical statutory
interpretation dispute involves a question of the relative importance to be placed on one
or another of the different methods. This section analyzes the strengths and weaknesses
of each of those methods. In the effort to be reasonably concise, the following discussion
necessarily oversimplifies to a degree but captures the key theories of interpretation and
the criticisms of each approach.
A.
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One leading approach to statutory interpretation is commonly called textualism.
It is common for judges in statutory interpretation matters to claim that they “start with
the text.” Strong textualists might also finish their analysis where they started, with the
text. The text-centered approach generally depends on the ability to resolve interpretive
disputes from words within the four corners of the statute itself. Although it is
impossible to eschew all extrinsic evidence, textualism plainly rejects consideration of
the legislative record for interpreting statutes.59 The controversy over textualism revolves
primarily around the issue of whether this objective is a realistic one.
1.

The textualist approach

Before all else, the traditional theory of statutory interpretation typicallybegins
with the statutory text. The judicial interpreter first looks to see if that text has a “plain
meaning” that is clear.60 The Supreme Court long ago declared that when “the language
of an enactment is clear . . . the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of
the meaning intended.”61 In determining whether the meaning of the statutory text is
plain, a judge may rely simply on the common understanding of the language of the text
and use sources such as dictionaries to discern the meaning of the words of the statute.
Even textualists realize that statutory words may lack a plain meaning and that
they may be ambiguous, at least in the context of the particular controversy before a
court. A word’s dictionary definition typically contains more than one possible
definition. Discerning the appropriate definition requires some consideration of context.
The “free exercise” of religion is not about weight rooms. Consequently, even textualists
realize that the statutory language must be considered in context.62 Reliance on context
might seem problematic for textualists, because context is external to text itself. This
problem can be consistently resolved, though, insofar as the textualist relies on the text to
provide the necessary context.
Textualism does not deny the possibility of linguistic ambiguity and can go
beyond the mechanistic consulting of dictionaries for definitions. The “whole act rule” is
a textualist recognition that context is crucial to the appreciation of a text’s meaning. As
Learned Hand poetically put it: “Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have
only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the
other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are
59
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used.”63 A renowned textualist such as Justice Scalia exhibits a “broad commitment to
understanding the statute in ‘context’” as part of interpretation.64
The “whole act rule” contains various subsets of interpretive rules. For example,
the rule counsels that the entire statute be read as a unified piece, which means that the
title of a section casts light on the interpretation of the words within that section.65
Another principle of the whole act rule is that the language of a section will be read in the
context of the full statute. Language that might have a plain meaning in isolation might
take on another meaning when other portions of the law are considered. This principle
also counsels that statutory provisions should be interpreted in a way so that they do not
conflict or create inconsistencies with other sections of the statute. Other aspects of the
rule are a presumption of consistent usage of language throughout a statute and a
presumption against interpretations that would derogate other provisions.66
Perhaps the most commonly used principle of the whole act rule is the rule against
surplusage. A given interpretation of statutory language might render another section of
the same statute superfluous. The rule against surplusage presumes that Congress does
not insert unnecessary, redundant language in its statutes. It has been called a “cardinal
rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be entirely
redundant.”67 Consequently, if an interpretation makes other language unnecessary
surplusage, the courts conclude that the interpretation is incorrect and seek an
interpretation that preserves some independent meaning for all parts of a statute.
A traditional standard for statutory interpretation that departs from textualism, yet
remains a part of the textualist theory, is the absurdity doctrine. When the
straightforward application of statutory text would create absurd results, judges may
disregard that application and render a non-absurd interpretation. The Court has
consistently reaffirmed the “legitimacy” of the absurdity doctrine, but only “infrequently
invoked” it.68
The absurdity doctrine presumes that when the text seems to call for an outcome
that “sharply contradicts commonly held social values,” the Congress could not have
intended such an outcome, and the text simply “reflects imprecise drafting that Congress
could and would have corrected had the issue come up during the enactment process.”69
This theory, though, relies on the faithful agent theory and contradicts some textualists’
position that courts apply statutes rather than legislative intent.70 Nevertheless, the use of
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the absurdity doctrine “has flourished even during the most textually oriented periods of
the Court’s history.”71 The doctrine might be seen as creating an escape valve for the
limited number of cases when pure textualism obviously produces absurd results and
represent a small bow to pragmatism by the textualists. The absurdity doctrine is an
exception, though, and not commonly deployed by the textualists.
2.

The critique of textualism

The primary critique of exclusive reliance on text centers on linguistic
indeterminacy. When interpreting the meaning of a text, it seems logical to begin with its
plain meaning. Yet this approach has been called a “fallacy.”72 The meaning of
language depends upon its context. Yet opening the interpretation to consideration of
context inevitably goes beyond the text itself. Textualism and the plain meaning doctrine
thus contain an inherent loophole that can be destructive of the theories’ aims.
The indeterminacy of all language has been extensively debated in the legal
literature, often by critical legal theorists. These “crits” contend that language has no
inevitable intrinsic meaning, so that a text can never dictate a particular interpretation.
Their position finds ample support in philosophical language theory, which demonstrates
that words have no intrinsic meaning.73 The meaning of text will inevitably vary “across
different interpreters and in different contexts.”74 The text itself has no meaning, absent
the context of its interpreter.75 If textual language is so indeterminate, it cannot dictate
judicial outcomes with any rigor. Judges who believe otherwise are simply fooling
themselves.76
The indisputable presence of some indeterminacy, though, does not imply that
language is utterly indeterminate.77 Claims that statutory language is indeterminate have
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been called “wildly overstated.”78 Language is “not radically indeterminate” because it
has a meaning fixed by communities.79 Words do have meanings within particular
language communities. Textualists need not claim that words have some abstract
meaning but merely that “statutes convey meaning . . . because members of a relevant
linguistic community apply shared background conventions for understanding how
particular words are used in particular contexts.”80 Even the “strictest modern
textualists” recognize the potential indeterminacy of language, but this does not itself
dejustify the approach.81 The critique of textualism may simply reflect an assault on a
straw man. The approach may be more determinate than the alternatives. Even strong
textualists, such as Justice Scalia, have expressly recognized that statutory interpretation
is not textually mechanistic and requires “a certain degree of discretion.”82 Arguably, the
extent of this discretion under textualism is less than the discretion enabled by other
interpretive approaches. Even if textualism cannot dictate one certain and true meaning
for statutory language, it may have a constraining effect by ruling out numerous arguable
meanings.
Dan Farber stresses that even pure textualism is not a “mechanical task” and
questions the extent to which textualism disciplines judicial statutory interpretation.83
Deciding the meaning of language for complex statutes passed in a particular context
“requires a good deal of judgment (not to mention expertise).”84 The cases that reach the
Supreme Court are not usually the easy ones, where the plain meaning of terms is
obvious.85 Consequently, the value of textualism as an interpretive methodology at the
district court level may not translate into Supreme Court decisionmaking. The Court may
by its nature hear only the cases where the text does not answer the question being
litigated. One need not embrace the radical indeterminacy of the crits to question
textualism. Segal and Spaeth have persuasively noted:
. . . construction through plain meaning possesses a chameleonic quality
that spans the color spectrum. First, English as a language lacks precision.
Virtually all words have a multiplicity of meanings, as the most nodding
acquaintance with a dictionary will attest.” Meanings, moreover, may
directly conflict. For example, the common legal word “sanction” means
to reward as well as to punish. The penumbral quality of a given word,
78

Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, supra note 000, at 441.

79
Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity and Authority, in LAW AND
INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 203, 222 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).
80

The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at 2458.

81

The Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 000, at note 29.

82

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

83

The Inevitability of Practical Reason, supra note 000, at 547.

84

Id. at 547-548.

85

Id. at 549.

especially in combination with others, insures wide-ranging discretion by
those charged with construing the overall meaning of the pertinent set of
words. Second, legislators . . . typically fail to define their terms . . .
because of the need to effect a compromise . . .. Third, one statutory or
constitutional provision or court rule may conflict with another. And
while some language may be clearer than others, the meaning of words
under construction in the types of cases heard by the Supreme Court . . . is
likely to be particularly opaque. Fourth, identical words in the same or
different statutes need not have the same meaning.86
To this list might be added the problem of a statutory gap or interstix where, by
definition, there is no text to resolve the interpretive question. All these features of
textualism lessen its disciplining rigor and call into question the theory’s ability to
produce definitive statutory interpretations.87
It might seem that the difficulties of textualism could be ameliorated with the
obvious and seemingly mechanical means for discerning the meaning of terms by
consulting a dictionary. The purpose of dictionaries is defining words, and dictionaries
would seem to be an unbiased source and logical resource for textual interpretation.88
Textualists on the Supreme Court have embraced the use of dictionaries in an “almost
fanatical” fashion.89 Yet the authors of dictionaries caution that meaning is dependent on
context and that a dictionary definition cannot determine the “correctness” of an
interpretation.90 Even textualists acknowledge this limitation of dictionaries, that the
meaning of words requires an appreciation of their context.91 Even absent the contextual
problem, dictionaries are not necessarily reliable guides to the meaning of words92 and
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they may differ among themselves.93 They unavoidably have “a limited capacity to
record the nuances of usage.”94 The limits of reliance on dictionaries are compounded by
the existence of numerous dictionaries, containing different definitions, and enabling
“dictionary shopping” for convenient definitions..95
The whole act rule does not cure the difficulties of purely textual interpretation.
This rule, a facially logical approach to interpretation, has also been questioned as
unrealistic. The rule that every word should have meaning and that statutes should be
interpreted to avoid surplusage does not conform to ordinary usage. Redundancy may
exist for a variety of reasons, including giving emphasis to a point. Posner notes that “a
statute that is the product of compromise may contain redundant language as a byproduct
of the strains of the negotiating process.”96 Other aspects of the whole act rule may also
reflect an unreasonable view of the legislative process.97 If interpreted as weak rules, or
guidelines, the principles behind the whole act rule are surely logical ones.98 Of course,
as a weak rule, it offers much less benefit as a rule for resolving the difficult cases that
come before the Court.
Textualism is not so simple as it might appear and not easily executed, but its
defenders stress its virtue of neutrality. They contend that textualist interpretation is less
susceptible to ideological manipulation than is consideration of legislative history. This
contention is unproven, however. Text may just as readily manipulable as legislative
history. Or textualism may even be worse in this regard. Tom Merrill suggests that
reliance on textualism “tends to make statutory interpretation an exercise in ingenuity –
an attitude that may be less conducive to deference to the decisions of other institutions
than the dry archival approach associated with intentionalism.”99 Statutory language has
been called “the wiggliest of legal creatures”100 and as such can admit of widely varying
93
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interpretations, even absent any consideration of extrinsic factors. If so, the greater
candor associated with pragmatic theories might actually constrain ideological
decisionmaking.101
While textualism has met considerable disfavor in many theoretical academic
commentaries, it remains appealing to judges.102 Perhaps a plain meaning rule has
practical value. Whatever its theoretical limitations, the plain meaning rule may still be a
useful “evidentiary rule of thumb.”103 Although language is never perfectly
indeterminate, alternative sources of interpretive guidance may be “more uncertain.”104
Thus, it is asserted that when “judges stick faithfully to the meaning of words as an
ordinary reader would understand them, they have less opportunity to write their own
proclivities into legislation.”105 This is an empirical matter, though. One can assert that
textualism constrains judges to a relatively more determinate outcome, but one can
counterassert that textualism simply provides an especially useful beard for whatever
outcome the judge prefers.106
Empirical research is necessary to evaluate the claims of the textualists. Sunstein
and Vermeule emphasize the critical importance of such research in evaluating
interpretive methods.107 Ironically, though, they continue to assert that formalistic textbased interpretation is more determinate than alternative methods, without so much as a
whiff of empirical grounding. They imply the existence of cases “in which courts have
used background purposes, not to make sense of the law, but to impose their own views
about sound policy.”108 Yet they raise no comparable challenge to textualism and instead
assume that it restrains the discretion of courts.109 This assumption needs to be
101
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empirically tested as well. Textualism might be just as amenable to ideological
manipulation as other theories of statutory interpretation.
B.

Legislative Intent

Typically juxtaposed against textualism is the reference to legislative intent for
interpretation. The textualists do not universally reject the consideration of legislative
intent in statutory interpretation, they simply argue that the text is the most (or only)
reliable evidence of this intent. This is sometimes called “objectified intent.”110 Such
objectified intent does not necessarily consistent with the actual intent of the enacting
legislators. Holmes explained this concept of objectified intent when he declared: “We
do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”111 Justice
Scalia has rephrased this as: “Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators’
intentions.”112 The textualists generally do reject theories that go beyond this objectified
intent to discern the legislature’s intentions, such as the consultation of the legislative
record compiled in the process of statutory enactment. It is the latter resort to legislative
history that distinguishes legislative intent as an approach to statutory interpretation.
1.

The legislative intent approach

Proponents of legislative intent seek to recreate the legislature’s intention in order
to resolve a particular statutory dispute. The interpretive approach generally associated
with legislative intent is consultation of the legislative history associated with a statute’s
passage. A court may examine the reports of committees or other legislative materials to
clarify the statutory text or elaborate it. The legislative process consists of numerous
materials, of varying types, and use of legislative history has evaluated the relative
importance of each.
Among the various sources of legislative history, there is an established hierarchy
of importance.113 Committee reports generally, and conference committee reports in
particular, are typically regarded as the most authoritative sources of legislative history
for the discernment of legislative intent. In the vast majority of cases, a bill reaches the
floor of a house of Congress only after being amended and approved in a committee and
110
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in tandem with a committee report explaining the bill. As one might expect from the
most authoritative source, committee reports are also the primary source of legislative
history utilized by courts.114
Other potential sources of statutory legislative history include floor debates or
hearings on a bill. These are generally granted less persuasive impact than provided to
committee reports.115 Statements by a bill’s opponent may be especially unpersuasive,
but statements by a bill’s drafter or sponsor are given greater respect.116 A statement
interpreting the bill made by an opponent is given relatively less credence.117 Other
aspects of the legislative process may also be examined in the search for legislative
intent. The explicit rejection of particular language in a proposed amendment can be
used as evidence that Congress did not desire that the bill contain such a provision.
More controversial sources of legislative intent involve post-enactment
developments. Post-enactment legislative history may include declarations by legislators
that a court decision “got it wrong” or “got it right,” oversight hearings on the
implementation of statutes, or subsequent legislative action related to prior judicial
decisions.118 The conventional theory calls for generally disregarding such postenactment legislative history, because it cannot represent the state of mind of the enacting
Congress. The Court has inconsistently adhered to the conventional theory and
sometimes considered this subsequent post-enactment legislative history.119 The
conventional theory is more amenable to consideration of such post-enactment legislative
history when it arises in the context of the reenactment of a statute (so that the postenactment legislative history is in a sense the enacting Congress), especially the explicit
rejection of a proposal that would alter prior precedents in a particular way.
When past courts have established a record of a certain interpretation, and the
legislature has apparently acquiesced in that interpretation by failing to correct it, a later
court may find this acquiescence evidence that the earlier interpretations were the correct
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one.120 If an administrative agency or a court has adopted a particular statutory
interpretation, and Congress has done nothing in response to that interpretation, the
legislative inaction may be viewed as acquiescence in the accuracy of the interpretation.
The court may presume that, had it misinterpreted the legislative intent, the Congress
would have corrected the mistaken judicial interpretation with new legislation. Because
of the congressional inaction, prior statutory rulings are given “heightened stare decisis
effect.”121 This principle has greater force when the legislature has reenacted or amended
the statute in question but not altered the record of judicial interpretation.122 The
presence of subsequent legislative action provides evidence that the legislature did not
merely overlook the judicial interpretation but more affirmatively embraced it.
Another related interpretive method for statutes involves discernment of the
general “legislative purpose” underlying the legislation and applying it to the case facts at
hand.123 While legislative purpose does not inherently require analysis of legislative
history, but may be gleaned from the circumstances surrounding the legislation’s passage
or even from the text itself, the reference to “purpose” is still a means of going beyond
straightforward textualism and getting to legislative intent. Consideration of legislative
purpose is thus an intent-based interpretive rule. A court may choose its statutory
interpretation based on the rule that seems to best fit the purpose of the Congress when
enacting the legislation.
Of these various means to ascertain the intent of the legislature, the greatest
contemporary controversy in statutory interpretation involves the use of the legislative
history to ascertain the legislative intent. While the reference to legislative intent in
statutory interpretation has a considerable historical pedigree, that fact has not dispelled
the controversy. Use of legislative history to ascertain legislative intent to guide statutory
interpretation is challenged at a purely theoretical level but also criticized for its
pragmatic effects, including its facilitation of ideological judicial decisionmaking.
2.

The critique of legislative intent
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At a theoretical level, some have questioned whether legislative intent has
any meaning at all. The legislature is a “they,” not an “it.”124 Aggregation of the
intentions of a multimember body is a difficult, if not impossible, task.125 In addition,
social choice theorists have conclusively demonstrated that the legislature may have no
purpose and the statute may have been a product of procedures rather than substantive
preferences.126 As a consequence, the “final outcome may represent only one of many
possible majority outcomes,” making it difficult to draw conclusions about legislative
intent.127 It can be difficult to determine (a) if a given position had majority support and
also (b) if the majority support for that given position was translated into a legal
command.
While this general theoretical criticism of the coherence of reference to legislative
intent has received considerable academic attention, it has not been a primary feature of
the general critique of reliance upon legislative history, though, and for good reason. The
theoretical argument only establishes that there may be no clear majority legislative
intent. Nothing in the theory disproves the possibility that a majority of the legislature
does have a clear and discernible intent. For the theory to be a true critique, its adherents
would need to demonstrate empirically that the legislature commonly has no majority
intentionalist position on the interpretation of a statute for the facts of contested cases,
and they have not even attempted to do so. Moreover, the coherence critique actually
counsels for greater use of legislative history. Consulting the details of the legislative
history would seem to be the most reliable means for ascertaining whether the legislature
did have a true majoritarian intent on a particular disputed issue.
The basic principles in support of textualism argue against reliance on legislative
history specifically and, at least sometimes, legislative intent more generally. This
criticism generally does not focus on the relative theoretical coherence of legislative
intent but rather draws upon the practical implications of use of intent and legislative
history. Judicial use of legislative history is criticized as relying on an inaccurate source
of intent. It is criticized as relying on an illegitimate source of intent, because the
124
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legislative background is not itself law. Legislative history is criticized as so
indeterminate that it enables judges to reach whatever decision they might desire and
justify that outcome with reference to some bit of historic legislative record.
Some have questioned the veracity of the legislative record. Remarks in the
Congressional Record may be amended after spoken and need not be spoken at all to be
included as part of the record of floor debate. The sources of legislative history, such as
committee reports, may say little about what the legislature did or intended to do and
more about the preferences of some isolated, unelected congressional staffer.128 Judge
Kozinski has likewise contended that going beyond statutory text “creates strong
incentives for manipulating legislative history to achieve through the courts results not
achievable during the enactment process.”129 The fear is that non-legislators such as
staffers can “stack the legislative history” to reach a result they favor.130
Well-heeled special interest groups may be empowered by use of legislative
history, at the expense of the majoritarian public interest. It is such interest groups with
the resources to involve themselves intimately in the legislative process that have the best
opportunity to insert salient language into a committee report, when they could not get
that language into a bill’s text.131 Thus, even the purportedly most authoritative source of
legislative history, the committee report, may be unreliable and subject to manipulation.
While these criticisms of legislative intent are superficially logical, they are truly
just circular arguments. When critics emphasize that the legislature did not pass the text
of a committee report and present it to the president, that claim begs the question. If
legislators know that certain legislative history will be considered when interpreting the
bill and pass a bill that has certain legislative history they are functionally “passing” the
use of that legislative history for textual interpretation. If a congressional staffer or
interest group inserts language in a committee report that is unacceptable to the majority,
nothing prevents the majority (of the committee or of the full body) from disavowing that
language, in the statutory text or subsequent legislative history. If the legislative majority
did not want committee reports or other sources of legislative history to be considered,
they could say so. When parties entering into a private contract wish to limit its
interpretation to its text alone, they include an integration clause that prevents the
consideration of extrinsic interpretive resources.132 If the legislature wanted to pass the
128
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text and only the text and exclude all judicial reliance on legislative history, the
legislature could make those wishes plain in the statutory text. The legislature’s failure to
do so would seem to imply its approval of such sources.
The practice of deferring to legislative history might be considered an implicit
incorporation of those materials by reference, rather than an improper delegation of
legislative authority to the staff.133 Proponents of the unlawful delegation theory have
responded that any such incorporation should be explicit to be given effect.134 This
position is insufficiently justified, though, and proves too much.135 Should Congress be
compelled to explicitly declare that its statutes are to be interpreted according to a
particular dictionary, or particular rules of grammar, or subject to particular canons of
construction?136 Requiring such explicit incorporation for particular statutes would
involve a considerable expenditure of legislative time and effort and yield far more
complex statutes. Perhaps for this reason contracts are not required to explicitly list all
relevant external aids to interpretation, when they may so easily be explicit in their
exclusion of such external referents.
This analysis of the circularity of the critique of legislative history is supported by
a social scientific understanding of the operation of Congress. Legislators, unable to
examine every particularity of every bill, delegate authority to agents, such as committees
and their staffs.137 This tendency was recognized long ago by Learned Hand, who
observed that “while members deliberately express their personal position upon the
general purposes of the legislation, as to the details of its articulation they accept the
work of the committees; so much they delegate because legislation could not go in any
other way.”138 As with any delegation, the agent is expected to conform to the will of the
that courts put on the absence of an integration clause in permitting consideration of extrinsic evidence.
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principal or face punishment, and congressional staffers perceive that there are “grave
risks in freelancing” and departing from the preferences of their legislator.139
Considerable political science research addresses the principal-agent relationship
of the full legislative chamber and the committees.140 Congress creates committees and
authorizes committee reports for a rational reason. The committees serve as a “system
for providing, by specialized and politically accurate reporting, information the chamber
needs to function amid uncertainty.”141 Keith Krehbiel of Stanford has extensively
investigated the organization of Congress and the important role that committees play.142
Krehbiel’s position is essentially that “committee members use their position not to
satisfy parochial interests, but rather to help fulfill the chamber’s need for accurate
information on policy choices.”143 Committees develop specialized knowledge about
particular policy problems and legislative responses, thereby avoiding the need for every
single legislator to investigate every single legislative issue. The committee agents are
then to use this information to formulate policies that fit the preferences of the full
legislative chamber. Krehbiel has found some evidence that committees act as
“microcosms of the parent chamber.”144 The actions of committees are monitored both
by the “chamber majority” and by “whistle-blowers in the minority.”145 Because the full
body has control over the membership on committees and the resources granted to
committees, it has some power to enforce the principal-agent relationship between the
full chamber and the committees producing reports.146
The committees, like any agents, are not perfect fiduciaries of their principal, the
broader chamber. Committees, members and staff may sometimes advance their own
139
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agendas at the expense of the broader interest. The presence of some infidelity does not
mean that the chamber does not rely upon the committee for legislation. Congress suffers
some policy infidelity as consideration for the costs in effort that committees incur in
developing specialization and drafting legislation and committee reports.147 Of course,
the acceptability of infidelity will be greater when the issue is not considered an
important one to the legislature and much lesser for highly salient issues. Empirical
research has confirmed that this is precisely the case. “Issue salience influences
committee responsiveness to the chamber.”148 The committees of the greatest importance
best reflect the preferences of the full body.149 Congressional committees do not advance
their own ideological interests contrary to the chamber nor further the goals of special
interest groups; rather, they tend to match the chamber’s preferences.150 Reliance on
committees is a delegation of authority to the legislative subunit.
Some textualists might claim that this legislative delegation of constitutive
authority to a committee is illegitimate, but that argument proves too much. Some even
find it unconstitutional on the grounds that the legislative power is non-delegable.151
Indeed, it would dejustify virtually all legislation. Even without consideration of their
reports, committees have the delegated authority to draft the initial language of the
legislation for the full legislature’s review and, as Arrow’s Theorem shows, such agendasetting power gives considerable control over the ultimate decision.152 Most “legislative
scholars concur that the committee system within the House shapes the policies enacted
by Congress.”153 Most obviously, the legislature sometimes considers bills under a
“closed rule” that prohibits floor amendments154 or other restrictions on action by the full
147
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chamber.155 Even without such a closed rule, the body as a whole typically accepts the
committee language without any changes.156 In general, the “full chambers do not, by
voting, make the choices, but rather they accept choices about details already made.”157
The argument against reliance on, or delegation to, staff undermines textualism
just as it undermines legislative history. A survey found that staffers typically have the
responsibility for drafting statutory language.158 Lobbyists are also regularly involved in
drafting the language of bills.159 The legislators “generally did not read the text” of the
bills drafted by the staffers.160 Staffers were just as likely to “freelance” when drafting
text as when drafting legislative history.161 The survey of congressional staff found that
there was “no strong basis” for distinguishing between text and legislative history based
on staffer involvement.162 The distinction between the two is artificial. Judge Wald has
observed that when a member of Congress votes for a bill “he or she intends to give
approval to and put imprimatur on both the language of the statute and the process that
produced it.”163
Individual legislators may often “vote for technical language that the legislator
does not understand, knowing that committee members believe . . . it has a proper
function.”164 They may not even have read the language of the bill on which they vote.165
Justice Scalia seemingly accepts this fact, that the legislators “do not know the details of
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the legislation itself.”166 He responds that this is irrelevant as it ignores “the central point
that genuine knowledge is a precondition for the supposed authoritativeness of a
committee report and not a precondition for the authoritativeness of a statute.”167 This
response would seem to be more of an assertion of a conclusion than an argument.
Actual knowledge need not be required in either case, if there is a delegation to a trusted
agent. The critics have yet to explain why a delegation to committees of unchecked
report-writing authority to guide interpretation would be illegitimate, when delegation to
committees of unchecked statute-writing authority is of unchallenged legitimacy.
The significance of an item of legislative history, such as a committee report, is
not intrinsically significant but is significant because the full Congress has delegated
some authority to that committee to clarify the meaning of a bill. The committee is
exercising the authority of the full chamber. Indeed, one might wonder why committees
would bother to go to the trouble of writing reports, if they were of no legal significance.
Dismissing the significance of such reports is dismissive of legislative choice.168 The
logical implication of the critique would call for the total elimination of many forms of
legislative history, such as committee reports. This judicial intrusion on the organization
of a coordinate branch is seldom if ever justified, though.
The circularity of the criticism can also be illustrated through another route.
Dedicated textualists do not hesitate to use extratextual sources other than legislative
history. Most typically, they will consult a dictionary or perhaps use some canon of
construction. Of course, the legislature never passed the contents of the dictionary or
canon into law. This does not trouble the textualist, who uses those sources only as
guides to interpretation of the text that the Congress did pass, not as independent sources
of law. Yet the same could be said of legislative history that is used as a guide to
interpretation of the text that the Congress did pass. These common theoretical
criticisms, thus, are not actually criticisms of judicial use of legislative history but only
criticisms of judicial misuse of legislative history. While they appear independent, the
criticisms collapse into the fundamental claim that legislative history invites misuse at the
hands of ideological judges.
Even those who favor the consideration of legislative history may have theoretical
questions about some categories of legislative history, such as post-enactment legislative
history. Using post-enactment materials is troublesome on several levels. For those who
believe in traditional textualism, post-enactment legislative history is especially
troublesome, because such history is not contemporaneous with the law and entirely
disconnected with the formalities of its passage. If one acknowledges that the current
legislature may not share the same preferences as the enacting legislature, giving weight
to post-enactment legislative history functionally creates an unconstitutional category of
legislation. It allows a legislature to amend the content of prior statutes through
166
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commentary, without going through the process of legislating. This same criticism
arguably applies to any reliance on legislative acquiescence or re-enactment.
The lack of contemporaneity of post-enactment legislative history can also be
troublesome for those using a legislative intent standard for statutory interpretation. Even
those who argue that Congress has properly delegated some legislative authority to
committees to create governing legislative history might not believe that Congress
delegated its authority to unknown future committees to retrospectively interpret the law
passed by an earlier Congress. Post-enactment legislative history is not necessarily
troublesome to pragmatists and may be consistent with dynamic statutory interpretation,
though it still has the reliability questions associated with any legislative history.
The preceding theoretical debate over the legitimacy of relying on legislative
history or other evidence of legislative intent may cover up the true basis for concern
about the practice. The greatest practical critique of reliance on legislative history may
be based on the discretion it gives judges in interpretation and consequent facilitation of
ideological bias. Segal and Spaeth question the sincerity of its use, just as they
questioned textualism.169 Justice Scalia argues that the use of legislative history “has
facilitated rather than deterred decisions that are based on the courts’ policy preferences,
rather than neutral principles of law.”170 He analogized it to looking over the heads of the
crowd to pick out your friends.”171 One can often find at least a few friends even in a
generally hostile crowd just as one might find ideologically convenient legislative history
in an otherwise contrary text and record.
There is nothing intrinsic in consultation of legislative history that is biased (the
congressional record may be conservative or liberal), the use of the tool may invite
insincere interpretation as a practical matter. The legislative history of a major law
includes a substantial body of commentary, ranging from committee reports to the
remarks of individual legislators. In this multitudinous commentary, an interpreter may
find it easier to support a preferred position.172 Judge Kozinski has suggested that
“[l]egislative history can be cited to support almost any proposition, and frequently is.”173
The conventional wisdom is that the resort to legislative history facilitates ideological
judging, and this claim may be the most common critique of reliance on legislative
history.174 Consequently, the purpose of constraining ideological judicial choice arguably
counsels for rules that prevent reliance on legislative history.
169

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, supra note 000, at
75 (suggesting that “[g]iven the variety of reasons that legislative intent may not exist, and the problems of
finding it in those cases where it does exist, perhaps we ought to discard completely judicial efforts to
fathom intent.”

170

A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 000, at 35.

171

Id. at 36.

172

See id. (noting that for “any major piece of legislation, the legislative history is extensive, and
there is something for everybody”).

173

See Robert Pear, With Rights Act Comes Fight to Clarify Congress’s Intent,” N.Y.T. Nov. 18,
1991, at A1.
174

See note ____ supra.

The discernment of legislative intent need not be confined to the legislative
history. Courts sometimes consider the overriding purpose of the law in its
interpretation. A legislature’s purpose might be gleaned from the text of the statute itself,
or its structure.175 If a purpose is not apparent from the text, perhaps it should not be
transformed into law. Purposes “are not transmitted frictionlessly into legislation”176 and
the legislature doubtless has many purposes that never find their way into any legislation
at all.177 The search for some definitive legislative purpose may therefore be vain.
Analysis of legislative purpose has been controversial for a number of other
reasons. For a time, the evaluation of legislative purpose was ascendant in statutory
interpretation.178 Reliance on legislative purpose, though, has its own interpretive
problems.179 The purpose of a statute is not always clear from its text and context. When
Congress passed the civil rights laws, was its primary purpose to prevent discrimination
against minorities who had historically suffered discrimination or to prevent all
discrimination based on membership in a protected class? One could argue for either. It
seems plausible that Congress had both purposes, which is unhelpful when those two
goals come into conflict.180
Even if a statute has but one goal, turning to legislative purpose can be
problematic. Some limiting principle is required but not offered by analysis of legislative
purpose. Suppose a statute is written to advance the public health through specific
measures. The legislative purpose is clear and unobjectionable and without direct
internal conflict. Yet Congress did not pass a law declaring: “do everything conceivable
to protect the public health.” The law is not unlimited. Reliance on the generalized
legislative purpose in interpretive controversies, though, is unlimited. Consequently, the
attempt to further the legislative purpose inevitably undermines the actual legislation, by
delimiting its scope.
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The greatest difficulty with reliance on legislative purpose may be its inherent
inconsistency. Every statute has at least two conflicting purposes. Consider the Clean
Air Act. The paramount purpose of this statute obviously was to provide for government
regulation to prevent air pollution. Yet the statute did not call for the impossible goal of
the elimination of all air pollution; it called for the reduction of pollution under certain
circumstances and limits. The universal invocation of the anti-pollution purpose of the
Clean Air Act would clearly defeat the legislative purpose, in cases that fell within one of
the limitations on that purpose. The Supreme court has observed that “no legislation
pursues its purposes at all costs.”181 Statutes rarely command absolutes and are typically
compromises between conflicting purposes.182 In the presence of such conflict, reliance
on legislative purpose is either fruitless or misleading.
Legislative purpose analysis may also be amenable to ideological judging.
Discerning the purpose of a statute is certainly a subjective process. Arguably, “willful,
manipulative judges” will attribute “a purpose to the statute that just happens to coincide
with the judges’ own policy preferences.”183 Professor Ely has suggested that “only a
hopelessly result-oriented judge would be able to assert that he knew which was ‘the’
motivation or the ‘dominant’ motivation underlying a statute.”184 Indeed, the concept of
legislative purpose does not even require particular supporting materials of legislative
history and might therefore be more discretionary and potentially ideological than
reliance on legislative history.
Reliance on legislative acquiescence in past judicial interpretations is also
commonly challenged. At a theoretical level, the acquiescence of a later, different
legislature cannot be a reliable guide to the intent of the enacting legislature, so
intentionalists would not necessarily favor this aspect of legislative history. Textualists
would not be expected to weight the position of later legislatures about the earlier
statutes, and acquiescence in the form of inaction obviously has not surmounted the
181
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constitutional hurdles to legislative enactment. While the Court has occasionally relied
upon legislative acquiescence, it has done so carefully, describing the doctrine as “at best
only an auxiliary tool,” as the Court does “not expect Congress to make an affirmative
move every time a lower court indulges in an erroneous interpretation.”185 Both
textualists and those who use legislative history might be more amenable to legislative
acquiescence, though, when the statute was reauthorized or revised, because the prior
judicial interpretations could be considered part of the context of the new statute.
Legislative acquiescence might seem consistent with a pragmatic or dynamic
approach to statutory interpretation, but even this association is debatable. As Posner has
observed, “[l]egislative agendas are crowded, the procedural barriers to enactment
formidable, and as a result legislatures usually can’t undo judicial decisions they don’t
like.”186 Thus, legislative acquiescence does not equate with approval from more recent
legislatures. Acquiescence may result from the issue being too insignificant to warrant
the expenditure of legislative time, or acquiescence may result from the controversial
nature of the matter and the inability to reach a subsequent legislative compromise.
Hence, even pragmatists might be cautious about reliance on pure acquiescence, in the
absence of statutory reauthorization or revision.
C.

Interpretive Canons

Historically, certain “canons” have been used in statutory interpretation. The
canons are judicially-created guidelines for the meaning of statutory language, under
certain circumstances. The canons might be considered either dispositive guides to
interpretation or mere presumptions. As guides to interpretation, the canonical approach
is distinct from the debate over text vs. legislative history and might even be considered
orthogonal to that approach. Hence, reliance on the canons cannot necessarily be
predicted from a justice’s view about the purposes of or appropriate tools for statutory
interpretation.
1.

The canonical approach

Canons may be simply interpretive rules for text. The canons of statutory
interpretation are of two distinct types. The first type is the linguistic canons. These are
like rules of grammar that enable textual understanding, and some are actual rules of
grammar. The second type is the substantive canon, which creates a preference for a
category of outcome, though not necessarily an ideological end. The linguistic canons
have a considerable historical pedigree, as reflected in the Latin language in which they
are often expressed.
The linguistic canons are intended as simple guides to interpretation, much like
the rules of grammar. Among the best known linguistic canons is expression unius est
exclusion alterius. Under this canon, the statutory inclusion of a particular approach or
authorization is interpreted as a presumption that other approaches or authorities are
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excluded.187 The linguistic canons of ejusdem generic and noscitur a sociis may be
viewed in tandem. Both establish a presumption that particular words should be
interpreted according to the company they keep and not viewed in isolation.188 The
literal rules of grammar themselves may also serve as interpretive canons, e.g.,
punctuation informs interpretation.189 These canons might be embraced by textualists as
part of the essential context of statutory language. Intentionalists might also rely on the
canons, on the theory that, as linguistic rules, they are presumably guides to the intent
underneath the legislative language.
Another set of canons is based on substantive policy and establish presumptions
for resolving unclear language. An early substantive canon was the principle that statutes
should not be interpreted in derogation of the common law.190 If a statutory text admitted
of two different interpretations, this canon directed judges to choose the interpretation
most consistent with the preexisting common law. The substantive canons represent built
in biases for certain categories of outcomes. These canons include presumptions that
statutes not be interpreted in derogation of sovereignty, that public grants be strictly
limited, that statutes not have extraterritorial application, that traditional state powers be
preserved, that judicial review be available, and others.191
The “rule of lenity” is an important substantive canon in cases involving a
criminal prosecution. It holds that if the criminal statute “does not clearly outlaw private
conduct, the private actor cannot be punished.”192 The effect of the rule is to allow
certain defendants, whose actions may be borderline criminal, to escape punishment, with
the goal of forcing the legislature to clearly prescribe the perimeters of the actions that it
wishes to criminalize. The rule of lenity is commonly invoked in criminal litigation and
also justified by the need to provide fair notice or warning of action that is illegal. The
scope of the rule of lenity is quite flexible, though, and permits convictions in the
presence of some statutory ambiguity, but not “grievous ambiguity.”193
The principle that statutes be construed so as to avoid creating serious
constitutional questions could be considered another substantive canon.194 If a statute is
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subject to two reasonable interpretations, and one of those interpretations would create
serious constitutional questions, this canon calls for the adoption of the other
interpretation.
The preceding examples are only a partial list of what might be considered
substantive canons of statutory interpretation. Others are less general in application and
not so frequently invoked, but they may be critical in a particular case. In general, the
substantive canons are not so well established as the linguistic canons, but some have a
considerable history and general acceptance.
2.

The critique of the canons

The linguistic canons appear on their face to be logical, uncontroversial and
ideologically neutral means of accurately interpreting statutory language. This
appearance was dispelled long ago by Karl Llewellyn, however.195 Llewellyn, in his
legal realism, contended that the canons themselves were highly indeterminate and could
be deployed by judges to reach desired results. To demonstrate this, he produced a chart
of the canons in “thrusts” and “parries,” showing that, like so many aphorisms, each
canon had a counterpoint.196 A judge could simply choose the thrust or the parry in order
to reach his preferred end. Llewellyn concluded that we should give up the “foolish
pretense” that judges should rely on “mutually contradictory correct rules” of statutory
interpretation.197 Thus, the canons, like legislative history, simply provided convenient
beards for ideological decisionmaking.
For some time, Llewellyn’s claim was accepted and became the conventional
wisdom.198 The Supreme Court itself has taken notice that canons “are often countered
by some maxim pointing in a different direction.”199 This tendency of the canons does
not simply make them incoherent. Rather, the presence of canons pointing in opposite
directions enables greater judicial discretion. A judge may pick and choose the canon he
or she wishes, in order to reach the result that he or she desires. Self-contradicting
canons empower the willful judge and result-oriented rulings.
Even if the canons were not self-contradictory, they may be challenged on logical
grounds. Consider the expression unius canon. When one makes a list, it is not
necessarily exclusive or comprehensive. If a person makes a list of “foods he likes,” it
does not imply that he dislikes every single food not contained on that list. The person
195
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may have overlooked some foods and may not have even considered other foods that he
has not yet sampled.200 Likewise a legislature “might create an exception to a general
grant without thereby wanting to prevent the courts from recognizing additional
exceptions, unforeseen at the time of enactment, that would be consistent with the grant’s
purposes.”201 Cass Sunstein has also noted that the failure to include an item in a list
“may reflect inadvertence, inability to reach consensus, or a decision to delegate the
decision to the courts.”202 The rule does not even necessarily comport with ordinary
language usage. As Max Radin put it, “to say that all men are mortal does not mean that
all women are not or that all other animals are not.”203 Richard Posner has declared more
generally that “most of the canons are just wrong” and do not reflect legislative intent or
even common sense.204
The linguistic canons have their defenders, though. Textualists have embraced
the canons as guides for interpretation that required no evaluation of legislative intent.205
The contemporary revival of the canons has not been limited to textualists. Cass Sunstein
has argued that Llewellyn’s critique was “greatly overstated.”206 David Shapiro called
the critique of the canons “grossly overdone.”207 Certainly, it is difficult to argue that the
rules of grammar should be ignored when interpreting language. Even the contemporary
defenders of the canons presented only a limited defense, however. For example, Shapiro
claims only that the “maxim of inclusio unius is a useful tie-breaker.”208 The canons,
even when they represent correct rules for interpretation, are thus “at best of modest
utility.”209
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The substantive canons have their own theoretical critics. The canon counseling
against derogation of the common law rule may have been logical in the early age of
statutory regulation but makes less sense in a contemporary world, where statutes are the
rule.210 One might fairly argue that the very purpose of statutes is to derogate the
common law – if the preexisting common law was deemed satisfactory, no statute would
be necessary.211 This canon may also produce an intrinsic conservative bias in statutory
interpretation.212 Regulatory statutes typically have a liberal end, somehow restraining
the laissez faire use of private property, so any narrowing interpretation of such statutes
will serve conservative purposes.213 The substantive canons are not consistently
conservative in operation, though, and may in fact tend to favor liberal outcomes.
In contrast to the conservative purposes of the common law canon, the rule of
lenity appears to systematically favor liberal outcomes in favor of criminal defendants.
The canon in favor of giving liberal interpretations to remedial statutes also will tend to
produce ideologically liberal decisions. The canon against interpretations raising serious
constitutional questions may also have a tendency to produce ideological liberal
outcomes, at least in the numerous constitutional provisions considered liberal. Other
canons, such as those favoring the preservation of federalism, may tend to yield relatively
conservative results.
While the fact that the substantive canons have no consistent ideological bias
might seem to make them ideologically neutral, this inconsistency may have the opposite
result. The conservative bias of the common law canon will frequently run up against the
liberal bias of the remedial statute canon, as remedial statutes typically modify the
common law rule. In this case, the canons simply free the judge to pick and choose the
most ideologically amenable canon and apply it. Thus, one would expect a conservative,
such as Justice Scalia, to favor the common law canon and deprecate the remedial statute
canon, as in fact he has.214 With such a conflict, the canons do not serve to constrain
ideological decisionmaking but actually further such imposition of judicial ideology,
because they provide additional tools for the ideologically minded judge. Indeed, Scalia
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himself has criticized the substantive canons for adding a “thumb of indeterminate
weight” to the decisionmaking scale, a practice that will not yield “uniformity or
objectivity.”215
Some reliance upon canons of interpretation is inevitable, because they are
nothing more than rules for interpreting language. Without such rules, language has no
meaning.216 Absent the interpretive direction provided by canons, there is no basis for
concluding that “black” does not encompass “white,” or that the affirmative excludes the
negative. This defense of canons in general theory, though, does not provide a defense
for the actual canons in operation. While some set of canons is necessary and desirable
as assistance in interpreting language, the current set of canons might not effectively
serve this purpose. If Llewellyn is correct, the prevailing canons do not guide
interpretation.
Canons are also inevitably appealing to the judiciary, because they seem to offer
neutral principles for statutory interpretation that constrain ideological judicial
decisionmaking, which may be tantamount to legislating. Canons expressed in Latin may
seem particularly judicial. Even the substantive canons, which are not neutral in their
implications, are at least consistent interpretive rules that should not vary with the
ideological proclivities of the particular justice. This effect may be a convenient fiction,
however. Posner argues that use of the canons actually promotes such judicial activism
because they “do not constrain judicial decision making but they do enable a judge to
create the appearance that his decisions are constrained.” As such, they may facilitate
ideological decisionmaking rather than constrain it.

IV.

The Justices and Theories of Statutory Interpretation

In general, the Supreme Court justices have not entered the academic fray on the
theories of statutory interpretation. There are exceptions to this rule, though, with Justice
Scalia by far the most notable exception. Justice Scalia has bravely held forth, both in
academic writings and judicial opinions, on the theories of statutory interpretation. The
above discussion has drawn on Justice Scalia’s views in elaborating theories, and this
section will summarize that position. His position clearly favors a textualist, rule of law
approach to the interpretation of statutes. He distinguishes this approach from a
“literalist” approach of “strict constructionism,” though, by considering the context of the
text.217 He even “delivered a series of speeches” that urged the courts “to abandon
virtually any reference to legislative history.”218
Justice Scalia is also a defender of the linguistic canons of interpretation. He has
referred to them as “so commonsensical that, were [they] not couched in Latin, you
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would find it hard to believe that anyone could criticize them.”219 Scalia challenges
Llewellyn’s thrusts and parries, suggesting that the parries are simply the product of
“willful, law-bending” judges.220 He will depart from his devotion to plain meaning, in
deference to canons, as he has held that the “ordinary meaning of the language in its
textual context” should controlunless “established canons of construction” require a
different result.”221 Indeed, Scalia is said to use the canons “aggressively,” even when
they “carry him far afield from any plain meaning or ordinary usage that an ordinary
reader, or even a member of Congress voting on the statute, might glean from the text.”222
Scalia does not embrace every canon, though.223 His feelings on the substantive canons
might be described as mixed.224
Scalia’s approach to statutory interpretation is renowned. He is known for his
“steadfast refusal ever to consider legislative history.”225 His rejection of legislative
history is grounded in multiple reasons. First, he rejects the theory that judicial statutory
interpretation should be grounded in the purpose of fulfilling legislative intent. Scalia
notes at a basic level that the members of Congress “need have nothing in mind in order
for their votes to be both lawful and effective”226 as evidence that intent is irrelevant.
Indeed, he suggests that in most cases this is the fact – that Congress didn’t consider a
matter or had no particular intent in mind when it did consider the matter.227
In addition, Scalia questions the reliability of legislative history as a guide to what
legislative intent may exist. He has declared that neither statements of legislators,
Executive statements or even the nonenactment of proposals “is a reliable indication of
what a majority of both Houses of Congress intended when they voted for the statute
before us.”228 Scalia also fears that judicial reliance on legislative history “will only
219
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encourage cynical attempts by interest groups – and their well-placed congressional allies
– to tailor the legislative history to influence future court.”229 He also questions any
reference to the statements or actions of any subsequent Congresses, such as reliance on
legislative acquiescence, declaring it irrelevant “what committees of the 99th and 95th
Congresses thought the 76th Congress intended.”230
Scalia also derogates the reliability of the legislative record. He argues that
references in congressional committee reports “were inserted, at best by a committee staff
member on his or her own initiative, and at worse by a committee staff member at the
suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist.”231
In addition to the above criticisms, Justice Scalia’s central concern about the use
of legislative history is its amenability to ideological manipulation. He declares it
“dangerous to assume that, even with the utmost self-discipline, judges can prevent the
implications they see from mirroring the policies they favor” when using legislative
history.232 Scalia sees textualism as a path that can minimize this results-oriented
statutory interpretation.
Justice Scalia has also rejected substantial reliance on legislative purpose as an
interpretive standard, stressing that the “principle of our democratic system is not that
each legislature enacts a purpose, independent of the language of the statute, which the
courts must then perpetuate.”233 Scalia does not wholly reject consideration of legislative
purpose, though.234 The purpose is surely a part of the context necessary for analyzing
the textual language. He does prefer to discern the legislative purpose from the text or
structure of an Act, rather than legislative commentary that is subject to the shortcomings
of any analysis of legislative history.235
Although Scalia has presented extensive theoretical analysis of statutory
interpretation, his key concern seems to involve the project of this empirical research –
that the judiciary will use the tools of interpretation to reach the results they ideologically
prefer. He argues that “under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed
legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and
desires.”236 He argues that utilization of legislative history facilitates judges’ ability to
229
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make decisions grounded in their own policy preferences rather than in the law.237
Scalia’s repeated concern is about “willful judges who bend the law to their wishes.”238
Scalia’s general approach to statutory interpretation is widely known but often
oversimplified. While he is stereotyped as a classic textualist, he sometimes appears to
bow to pragmatism in statutory interpretation.239 Indeed, he has even declared the
“consideration of policy consequences” to be one of the “traditional tools of statutory
construction.”240 Scalia has thus accepted the absurdity doctrine and demonstrated a
willingness to ignore text that would produce an absurd result.241 Scalia has also
accepted Chevron deference to administrative agency interpretations, which might be
considered a pragmatic approach.242 He has consistently assailed reliance on legislative
history.
Justice Scalia’s view is typically juxtaposed against the contrasting theory of
Justice Breyer, who has also written on interpretive theories for statutes, including
testifying before Congress, before he was elevated to the Supreme Court.243 Breyer does
not reject reliance on statutory text but argues that textualism “does not offer much help
in particular cases,” because clear text is not litigated.244 Consequently, he would rely
upon extratextual sources for guidance in statutory interpretation, particularly legislative
history.
Breyer has developed what might be called the “busy Congress” model, reflecting
the political science understanding of delegation to committees.245 He notes that
“legislation is not spontaneously generated, but arises out of a highly complex, public,
time-consuming, detailed process of hearings, debate, and negotiation, typically
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involving most, or all, of those groups whom the future law will likely affect.”246 While
this busyness might support the argument that misleading bits of legislative history could
be inserted into the record, Breyer argues that those “directly involved . . . will subject,
not only the text of the law but also committee reports, floor statements, and other
relevant comments to scrutiny; they too may become the subject of negotiation.”247
While the elected representatives of the people are not familiar with all the legislative
history, they also may be unfamiliar with particulars of statutory text.248 In both cases,
they may rely on staff and affected groups “to identify major controversial matters and to
help resolve them.”249 Hence, the legislative history is an integral part of the bill, much
like the text itself.
Breyer has continued his public support for reliance on legislative history and
elaborated on its basis. He argues for a purposive, rather than a linguistic, approach to
interpretation, in both statutory and constitutional matters. Breyer’s proposed approach
to a case asks “how a (hypothetical) reasonable member of Congress, given the statutory
language, structure, history, and purpose, would have answered the question, had it been
presented.”250 His preference is grounded in a constitutional respect for democratic
governance and a pragmatic consequentialist concern. While Breyer concedes that his
methodology is a subjective one, he argues that the textualist “does not escape
subjectivity, for his tools, language, history, and tradition can provide little objective
guidance in the comparatively small set” of important Supreme Court cases.251 The
textualist outcome will be “no less subjective” but “far less transparent than a decision
that directly addresses consequences.”252
The methodological positions of the other justices, who have not addressed the
issue outside opinions, are not so clear. Justice Stevens has written very briefly on a
clever Shakespearean perspective on interpretation.253 He noted that the first rule of
statutory interpretation was to “read the statute,” but cautioned that the statutory text
would not necessarily resolve the controversy before the Court.254 He proceeded to
declare that: “If you are desperate, or even if you just believe it may shed some light on
the issue, consult the legislative history,” but cautioned that such history may be an
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unreliable guide.255 He also gestured to pragmatism in calling for the use of “good sense”
in judicial statutory interpretation.256 His article is consistent with a pluralist approach to
interpretation.
Other justices have not left such a paper trail, and their respective approaches are
not entirely clear. In a review of the 1988-89 term, Judge Wald characterized justices
Scalia and Kennedy as “true believers” in textualism, and suggested that Justices
Rehnquist and O’Connor leaned in that direction.257 At around that time, Professor
Eskridge described Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy as “statutory nominalists,”
while he considered Justices Stevens and O’Connor as “pragmatists.”258 Twelve years
later, he concluded that Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer were pragmatic
textualists.259 Like Stevens, many of the justices might be considered pluralists, using
different theories in different cases, rather than true devotees of any one approach to
statutory interpretation.260 A review focusing on maritime decisions argued that Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer had a natural law approach that
considered the purpose behind the law, while Justices Scalia and Thomas were
“formalists” focused on text, Justice Rehnquist was deferential to the legislature and thus
open to legislative history, and Justice Stevens was an “instrumentalist” more closely
attendant to consequences.261 These conclusions seem to be ad hoc assessments based on
a reading of Supreme Court opinions. The best evidence of the justices’ approaches,
though, is available in a more systematic study of their opinions, which are analyzed in
the following section.
V.

Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation

An enormous amount of ink has been spilled on statutory interpretation, much of
it dealing with matters descriptive rather than purely normative. Academics have made
claims about the types of interpretation that prevail at the court and about their effects.
Some claim that the utilization of legislative intent simply empowers ideological
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decisionmaking, while others assert that textualism is equally vulnerable to ideological
manipulation. While these claims typically have some empirical support, in the form of
case examples, this evidence is anecdotal and not rigorous. This section provides a more
rigorous analysis of the practice of statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court and the
effect of different approaches.
There is some limited quantitative empirical study of statutory interpretation in
the courts. One study quantitatively analyzed the use of statutory interpretation
methodologies by the Supreme Court.262 It analyzed the sources used in statutory
interpretation over the Court’s history since the 1890s. Text was the most common
resource (appearing in 84.1% of the cases) and the materials of legislative history have
been commonly used (reports in 32% of the cases, debates in 16.9% of the cases, and
hearings in 12.6% of the cases).263 Citations on the consideration of practical
consequences, while not so frequent, consistently occurred.264 The use of these materials
remained fairly stable over time.265 The results also found that citations to textual and
legislative history sources were associated with one another, implying that the two are not
in the conflict often hypothesized.
This existing empirical research is of historical significance but doesn’t help
much in answering the key questions regarding statutory interpretation, however. This
study only coded citations, though.266 Consequently, a majority opinion that declared
certain legislative history to be unreliable would be coded as using legislative history.
More significantly, the study did not consider any effects of ideology or individual
justices. Understanding the role played by different approaches to statutory interpretation
requires analysis of particular opinions and outcomes from particular justices.
One recent study by Howard and Segal sought to capture the intersections of
interpretive theory and ideology in a rigorous fashion.267 The authors sought to test for
the justices’ fidelity to the interpretive theory of originalism in both constitutional and
statutory cases. They examined briefs filed with the Court and coded them as to whether
the litigants made claims that the text supported their position and whether that claim was
disputed by the other side in the case.268 The authors then examined each justice’s vote
based on the nature of the textual arguments and the ideology of the parties. They found
that the presence of legal arguments based on text or intent were not statistically
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significant determinants of votes, when controlling for ideology.269 These findings give
cause to question the sincerity of the judicial devotion to interpretive methodologies.
The Howard and Segal research does not truly answer the important statutory
interpretation questions, however. They combined constitutional and statutory cases,
though the two present distinctly different theoretical approaches. Their analysis was
based entirely on the briefs filed with the court and did not consider the theories that were
actually employed in the opinions of the Court. Finally, they used a very twodimensional system of coding, without considering the broader spectrum of the theories.
Thus, they did not consider such arguments as the absurdity doctrine and the canons of
interpretation and did not distinguish between references to legislative history and
legislative purpose. The following analysis elaborates on this research to fill these gaps.
Empirical analysis cannot discern the internal reasons of a justice’s thinking.270
The data cannot demonstrate conclusively that a justice is consciously insincere and
adopts a particular theory in a particular case (or generally) for the reason that it yields
ideologically desirable results. Empirical results can inform our evaluation of these
reasons, however. More significantly, such analysis can show the real world
consequences of particular interpretive theories, which is of greater import than the
internal reason, in any case.271
A.

The Methodology of the Quantitative Empirical Analysis

The study involves Supreme Court decisions involving statutory interpretation
between the years 1994 and 2002, inclusive. The time period roughly captures the
natural court following Stephen Breyer’s appointment. Cases were initially screened
through use of West’s key number system, for cases with a headnote on “statutes.” These
cases were then screened for decisions using one of the interpretive methods studied.
Over 120 cases were sampled, providing over one thousand separate justice-votes for
analysis. The vote of each justice is the basic unit of analysis for this study.
Each of these justice-votes was coded for the type of case, whether the outcome
of the vote was considered to be liberal or conservative, and the theories of statutory
interpretation employed (or criticized) in the opinion joined or written by that justice and
whether that opinion was for the majority, a dissent or a concurrence. This provides a
database that enables examination of the relative effects of personal ideologies and
interpretive theories on Supreme Court decisionmaking. Cases were also coded by the
year decided and the number of justices in the decisionmaking majority. Appendix A
provides greater detail on the coding methods for particular variables. Appendix B
contains additional information through descriptive statistics about the nature of cases in
the database.
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B.

The Justices and Ideological Decisionmaking

Given the prior research, the effects of judicial ideology must be considered.
Ideology may explain the results of my research, wholly independent of theories of
statutory interpretation, and the exploration of the intersection of ideology and
interpretive theories is also of crucial importance. It may be important to separate out the
cases where the decision was unanimous. By their very nature, unanimous decisions do
not appear to be ideologically driven. If justices of very diverse political ideologies agree
on an outcome, that result suggests that something other than ideology explains the
outcome.
The actual significance of unanimous decisions is unclear. Some political
scientists claim that these decisions can tell us nothing about ideological decisionmaking,
hypothesizing that a unanimous decision simply reflects a case where a party’s ideology
is beyond that of even the most extreme justice. Thus, when Scalia or Thomas casts a
liberal vote in a unanimous decision, it simply means that the conservative party took a
position that was “too conservative” for Scalia or Thomas. An alternative explanation for
unanimous decisions, though, could be found in the constraining effect of the law. A
decision may be unanimous, because the law was so clear that a justice would be forced
to reach a result that he or she might find ideologically undesirable. Yet a third possible
explanation is that the unanimous decisions occur in “cases which are of little interest –
politically, ideologically, or intellectually – to the Court,”272 and therefore not worth the
trouble of writing a dissent. These explanations are not exclusive – different unanimous
decisions might be explained by different theories. This article takes no preempirical
position on the dispute, but considers results both including and excluding unanimous
decisions of the Court. Table 1 reports the ideological direction of the votes in the
database for each of the justices.
TABLE 1
Percentage of Conservative Votes
Justice
All Cases Non-Unanimous
Breyer
39.6%
34.4%
Ginsburg
40.2%
31.9%
Kennedy
62.8%
70.3%
O’Connor
68.9%
81.7%
Rehnquist
70.2%
82.4%
Scalia
71.4%
83.3%
Souter
45.8%
42.5%
Stevens
27.4%
14.1%
Thomas
76.5%
89.0%

272

The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 000, at 1112.

The data demonstrate that ideology is an important factor in judicial outcomes, and the
nature of these results conform fairly well to prior research and general expectations.
Justice Stevens consistently votes for the liberal outcome, overwhelmingly so in nonunanimous decisions. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas are similarly reliable
conservative votes, particularly in non-unanimous holdings. A somewhat surprising
result is the degree of conservatism of Justice O’Connor in these statutory cases, as she is
not so conservative in controverted constitutional decisions. Other justices, especially
Justice Souter, do not appear so consistently ideological in their votes, though this may
only indicate that his ideology is a moderate one.
These results cast some doubt on the ability of the law to restrain the ideological
inclinations of the judges in statutory interpretation actions. If the law were consistently
constraining, one would not see this pattern of ideological voting. However, the results
do not exclude the possibility that the law has some influence on the justices. Even the
most ideological of the justices occasionally vote contrary to their presumed preferences.
The key to this study is ascertaining whether particular legal theories of statutory
interpretation have a greater influence in constraining the justices.
C.

The Justices and Theories of Statutory Interpretation

Analyzing statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court als requires some
measure of the degree to which the justices consistently conform to a particular
interpretive methodology. As discussed above, Scalia is known for a devotion to
textualism, while Breyer is dedicated to the theory of legislative intent. Reputedly
“Scalia is sufficiently committed to his views about legal method that he often declines to
join other Justice’s opinions that employ improper methods.”273 Indeed, Scalia has on
occasion concurred and simply declined to join a portion of an opinion relying on
legislative history.274 However, he has also been called a “fallen textualist,” who fails to
practice the theory “sincerely and consistently.”275 Both these claims are based only on
anecdotal examples, though, as no empirical analysis has examined the extent to which
the justices consistently adhere to particular approaches. Table 2 presents a measure of
the degree to which particular justices employ some of the major theories of statutory
interpretation.
To create measures for particular theories, I created new variables, combining the
justices’ use of several variables. Textualism (TEXT) is a new variable created from the
combination of textualism, use of the plain meaning rule, use of dictionaries, use of
common understanding of textual words, and use of the whole act rule. Legislative intent
(LEGINT) is created from the combination of a direct use of legislative history, reference
to legislative history, finding of ambiguity in statutory text, reliance on congressional
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inaction or reliance on congressional reenactment in interpretation. CANON is a
combination of reliance on any of the linguistic canons. For each theory, each justice is
given a score that indicates his or her use of that theory.276 I also created a variable for
pragmatic interpretation (PRAGMA) as a combination of reliance on the absurdity
doctrine and reliance on deference to the executive branch.277 Table 2 presents the
measures for each of the justices and each of the general theories.
TABLE 2
Justices’ Use of Interpretive Theories

Breyer
Ginsburg
Kennedy
O’Connor
Rehnquist
Scalia
Souter
Stevens
Thomas

LEGINT TEXT CANON PRAGMA
1.21
1.05
.02
.28
1.18
1.21
.04
.25
1.03
1.30
.04
.13
.76
1.34
.03
.18
.89
1.37
.03
.10
.45
1.44
.03
.06
1.20
1.18
.02
.22
1.41
1.09
.03
.28
.57
1.44
.02
.05

The results are roughly as expected. Breyer commonly relies on legislative intent, more
than any justice other than Stevens, and Scalia is least likely to rely on legislative intent.
Some might be surprised that Scalia has a positive score for legislative intent, but this is
due to the fact that legislative intent includes more than simple reliance on legislative
history and the fact that Scalia joined a few opinions that used legislative history, though
he authored none. All of the justices rely heavily on text for interpretation, though Scalia
and Thomas use text somewhat more than Breyer and Stevens (the only two justices who
deploy legislative intent more than textualism). The more liberal justices tended to more
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often invoke the approaches of pragmatism. None of the justices rely heavily on the
linguistic canons. As expected, the canons may be no more than “tie-breakers” and are
not particularly associated with the justices’ differential overarching interpretive theories.
These findings are again roughly consistent with the general reputation of the justices’
interpretive approaches.
At this point in the analysis, there appears to be a rough correlation between a
justice’s ideology and his or her interpretive approach. The more conservative judges
tend to rely on the materials textualism, while more liberal judges are more willing to
turn to external materials to discern the legislature’s intent. To fully understand this
association, though, requires consideration of the particular justices’ ideological
preferences and how they integrate with the particular justices’ interpretive theories.
D.

The Significance of Ideology and Theories of Statutory Interpretation

At this point of the analysis, I have shown that the justices are relatively
predictable in the ideology of their voting patterns, though none of the justices are
perfectly predictable. Some justices have ideological tendencies, and they also show
tendencies in their patterns of reliance on interpretive theories. The next questions are
whether justice ideology drives choice of interpretive theory, whether interpretive theory
is the cause of ideological outcomes, or whether the two have discrete and separate
impacts.
Before analyzing particular justice-votes, it is important to consider whether the
theories of interpretation are themselves intrinsically ideologically oriented.278 Perhaps a
given theory (e.g., textualism) naturally tends to produce particular ideological outcomes
(e.g., conservative). A particular theory may be chosen because it conduces to a pattern
of desired outcomes. This complicates the analysis. If so, a justice might adopt a
particular theory because it produced ideologically preferred results, but, alternatively, a
justice’s predictable ideological pattern of results might simply be attributable to his or
her devotion to a particular legal theory and say nothing about ideological voting.
As a preliminary test of the ideological effects of interpretive theories, all of the
individual statutory interpretation variables (listed in Appendix A) were entered as
independent variables in a regression, with ideology as the dependent variable. Table 3
reports the results for those variables that met the .05 standard for statistical significance.
A positive sign reflects a liberal outcome effect, while a negative sign is conservative.
The variables not included in the table were not statistically significant in their directional
effect.
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TABLE 3
Interpretive Approaches and Ideological Direction
Variable
Coefficient Significance Level
Text Use
.08
.01
Textualism
-.11
.00
Plain Meaning
.17
.00
Ambiguity
.14
.00
Technical Meaning
.13
.00
Absurdity
-.07
.03
Legislative History
.15
.00
Post Enactment
.08
.01
Reenactment
-.12
.00
Legislative Purpose
.07
.05
Chevron
.16
.00
Lenity
.20
.00
Retroactivity
-.12
.00
Noscitur
.12
.00
These preliminary results do not present a clear picture of the ideological impact
of interpretive theories. Some of the results are as sometimes predicted – use of
legislative history, legislative purpose, and finding ambiguity in language produced
liberal results. Other results, though are contrary to prediction. While reference to
textualism was conservative, the express use of statutory text was associated with liberal
results. Just as one might expect, the canon against retroactive application of statutes
tends to yield conservative results, while the rule of lenity tends to yield liberal outcomes.
Still other results seem to simply be inexplicable. There is no apparent reason why the
noscitur canon would be expected to yield significantly liberal results. In part, these
results may simply be the product of omitted third variables. Moreover, when so many
distinct independent variables are entered into a regression, statistical significance for the
variables is much more likely, and particular findings may be a mere matter of chance
rather than a true association.
To reduce the number of independent variables in search of a true association, the
same regression was run with the grouping of interpretive approaches into theories, as
discussed above.279 Table 4 reports the results of this test.
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TABLE 4
General Approaches and Ideological Direction
Coefficient Significance Level
LEGINT
.121
.000
TEXT
-.016
.589
CANON
.047
.118
PRAGMA
.132
.000
The groupings show some significant ideological effects of particular interpretive
approaches. Reference to legislative intent and pragmatism both had a significant
directional effect, and both produced more liberal decisions. Textualism proved more
conservative but had no statistical significance in its effect. From these results, it appears
that interpretive theories have ideological implications, but these results are still too
preliminary to draw any confident conclusions about their effects.
To understand the true effect of theories of statutory interpretation, additional
analysis is required. The intersection of statutory interpretation theories and judicial
ideology must be considered. There is no intrinsic reason why any of these theories
should produce ideological results. Legislative history may come from conservative
legislators, too. The results reported in Table 4 may simply reflect a fact that liberal
justices like to justify their rulings with legislative history, while conservative justices
prefer to justify their rulings with express reliance on textualism and eschew any
reference to legislative history.
The first test of theories of statutory interpretation involves judicial consensus.
The current justices of the Supreme Court clearly have varied ideological preferences, as
demonstrated by past research. When these justices join together in a ruling, that may be
evidence that their preferences are being constrained by legal rules, such as theories of
statutory interpretation.280 As discussed above, a unanimous ruling might be explained
by the presence of overwhelming legal arguments that overrode a justice’s ideological
preferences. Consequently, if a particular statutory interpretive approach tends to result
in higher levels of judicial consensus, that would be evidence that this approach
minimizes ideological decisionmaking through traditional rule of law values.
Conversely, an approach that produced dissensus might be one that permitted greater
judicial ideological discretion.
Table 4 presents a regression of the theories of statutory interpretation and judicial
consensus. The dependent variable is simply the breakdown of the justice-votes in the
case (e.g., a 7-2 decision is measured as .77, while a 5-4 decision is measured as .55). In
addition to the broad categories of interpretive theories used in Table 2, Table 4 reports
the results, with coefficients and levels of statistical significance.
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TABLE 5
Interpretive Theories and Judicial Consensus

LEGINT
TEXT
CANON
PRAGMA

Coefficient Significance
-.019
.558
.322
.747
.032
.295
.095
.003

Of the interpretive theories, only pragmatism was significantly associated with greater
Court consensus. The invocation of legislative intent principles was found in cases with
a lower degree of consensus, but textualism, legislative intent, and the canons had no
statistically significant effect on consensus. While this suggests that pragmatism may in
fact be a neutral principle to constrain ideological decisionmaking and produce
consensus, this test still lacks any direct ideological measure for the preferences of the
justices. Consequently, the results may not show an effect of law but simply the fact that
more justices prefer pragmatic methods to others, causing these methods to capture more
votes.
To incorporate the effect of the justices’ ideology, the next test incorporates
quantitative measures of their ideology. One measure is the set of Segal-Cover scores.281
These are ideological scores attached to justices based on press descriptions of their
ideology at the time of their appointments. The Segal-Cover ideological measures are
widely used but may fail accurately to capture judicial ideology. For example, they code
Stevens as distinctly conservative based on press coverage at the time of his appointment
by President Ford, though he is generally regarded as being quite liberal in his
preferences, as confirmed by the data in this and other studies.
The Sirovich scores are a direct measure for justice ideology in the votes they
cast.282 These scores are based on actual judicial voting and whether the justices tended
to vote for liberal or conservative ends. As such, their use might be criticized as circular,
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using voting patterns as an independent variable to study the dependent variable of voting
patterns. However, they may better capture the true preferences of the justices, and the
Sirovich scores are based on the full docket of the Court, including many constitutional
decisions, while my data is limited to statutory interpretation decisions. Because each set
of ideology scores has its limitations, I ran separate regressions with each. The
dependent variable is the ideological outcome of the case. Independent variables are each
of the two measures for justice ideology, plus the interpretive theory variables from the
preceding table. Table 5 reports the results of two multiple regressions, using each of the
measures for judicial ideology.
TABLE 6
Interpretive Theories and Judicial Outcomes
Segal-Cover
Segal-Cover .166(.000)
Sirovich
LEGINT
.105 (.001)
TEXT
-.009 (.763)
CANON
.049 (.101)
PRAGMA
.121 (.000)

Sirovich
.302 (.000)
.078 (.009)
.007 (.808)
.048 (.102)
.106 (.000)

Both measures for justice ideology are highly significant determinants of the ideology of
the justice’s vote, with Sirovich being a much more powerful predictor and dwarfed the
effect of any of the legal interpretive variables. If votes were purely ideological, one
would expect to find no statistical significance for any of the legal variables as
determinants of outcomes. If a legal variable has significance over and above the effect
of ideology, that provides some evidence that its use causes justices to depart from their
preferred ideology, with the associated implication that it serves to constrain judicial
ideology. While textualism is often invoked as an interpretive theory to constrain
ideology, it did not have this effect. The variable had no approximation of statistical
significance. The legislative intent and pragmatism variables, which are often criticized
for expanding judicial discretion, actually showed statistically significant effect in
constraining the effects of judicial ideology. These results held for both measures of
justice ideology. Rules of pragmatism also showed a constraining effect in the earlier test
of Court consensus.
The significant effect of reliance on legislative intent tended to produce more
liberal decisions, but its independent statistical significance suggests that it was
producing relatively liberal decisions from relatively conservative justices. Those
conservative justices were by no means compelled to resort to legislative intent to yield a
liberal decision. Rather, they may have been persuaded by the legislative history that
Congress intended a result more liberal than the conservative justices might have
preferred. Of course, the external statistical analysis cannot reveal the internal thought
process of the justices. An inference from this finding, though, could be that determinate
legislative history persuaded conservative justices that the correct statutory interpretation
in a case was the more liberal one.

There are some significant limitations to these findings that must be recognized.
Both the choice of interpretive methods and outcome were within the control of the
justices for each of the cases.283 Hence, it is possible that when a conservative judge
actually preferred to reach a liberal result, they chose to use legislative history to reach
that outcome. The justices may simply choose the approach that best produces their
desired outcomes. In this case, legislative history would not have had any actual
constraining effect.284 In addition, because it is impossible to assign one “correct”
decision to any particular case, these results cannot conclusively demonstrate that the use
of legislative history (or pragmatism) had this effect of driving justices to moderate their
ideology to reach the “correct” outcome. The data do provide somewhat stronger
evidence, though, that textualism is not constraining. Hence, the claim that one should
prefer textualism over legislative history as a means of constraint is more clearly refuted
by these results.
Perhaps the clearest and most important result of this analysis requires a broader
perspective on the ideological consequences of doctrines. There may be a metaideological effect of interpretive regimes. If legislative history systematically tends to
yield more liberal results, even for more conservative judges, that result might explain the
different approaches to interpretive theory. The more conservative justices might have
chosen to reject legislative history, not because it produces more ideological results but
because it produces more liberal results. And the more liberal justices might prefer use of
legislative history for this same reason. In this perspective, the fight over choices of
interpretive doctrine is itself an ideological one, independent of the outcomes of
particular cases. The battle over interpretive theories, rather than over individual cases
would therefore be the true ideological battleground. Because Supreme Court decisions
are more important in their precedential doctrinal effects than in their particular case
outcome effects, this conclusion would suggest the importance of ideological
decisionmaking and suggest that previous studies limited to the analysis of outcomes
could even underestimate the role of ideology.
Conclusion
The empirical findings in this article cannot resolve the contested issues of
statutory interpretation. They cannot demonstrate that a particular purpose or particular
method of statutory interpretation is preferable. Nor can they validate or invalidate all of
the arguments underlying the theoretical debate. The findings are, however, essential to
the evaluation of this contest. The results offer strong evidence against one central claim
of the textualists – that the strict textual approach to interpretation best constrains the
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In Howard and Segal’s study, supra note 000, the authors sought to avoid the problem of justice
choice by examining the briefs of the parties and isolating cases where the justices were presented with
only one interpretive theory to accept or reject. A sampling of the cases in this database revealed that the
briefs universally made both textual arguments and references to legislative intent. Hence, it was
impossible to separate cases in which the justices had only one interpretive theory to accept or reject.
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The fact that the more moderately conservative justices were the most likely to use legislative
history is consistent with this suggestion.

ideological inclinations of the justices.285 In fact, reliance on textualism showed no
constraining effect, once justice ideology was accounted for. By contrast, legislative
intent and pragmatism demonstrated some such effect, even after controlling for justice
ideology.
One of the most important, if not the most important, principles in the debate over
methodologies of statutory interpretation has been the need to cabin judicial discretion
with law. This argument has been most frequently deployed by textualists arguing
against use of legislative history, and their contention may have become the conventional
wisdom of today. This wisdom, though, has been supported only by intuition rather than
rigorous analysis. This quantitative empirical analysis of Supreme Court decisionmaking
shows the conventional wisdom to be potentially backwards – that textualism does not
constrain judicial ideology but the use of legislative intent and pragmatism may be
constraining. The results show that textualism is not an effective tool for moderating
willful ideological decisionmaking in the Supreme Court. Of course, if it is true that the
theories have distinct ideological implications of their own, it is possible that none of the
theories cabin ideology and that the choice of theories is simply another front in the
ideological battle.
Far too often, the debate over statutory interpretation relies upon factual
presuppositions that lack any rigorous support. This is traditionally the case with those
who seek to constrain willful ideological judging. This empirical analysis sheds some
light on the issue and the effect of interpretive tools on outcomes, independent of
ideology. As is the case with any preliminary study, the reader should not take the
findings as conclusive. Additional research on the matter, using more and different cases,
with different sets of justices is important. Research on the effect of these doctrines on
lower courts would also be extremely valuable. The latter study would greatly illuminate
whether interpretive theories are chosen for the ideological implications of their
precedential doctrinal effects.
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This concern for constraint of judicial discretion has been called the “obsessive desire” of the new
textualists. See Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process, supra note 000, at 830.

APPENDIX A
Variables and Coding

The data in this study involved coding Supreme Court decisions between 1994 and 2002.
The vote of each individual justice was separately coded for variables including method
of statutory interpretation, type of case, and ideological direction of the vote.
The statutory interpretation variables that were coded included:
Text Use – Was the text of the statute used in the opinion?
Textualism – Did the opinion make explicit reference to textualism?
Plain Meaning – Did the opinion expressly invoke the plain meaning rule?
Ambiguity – Did the opinion find the statutory language to be ambiguous?
Dictionary – Was a dictionary used to ascertain the meaning of statutory text?
Common Understanding – Did the opinion use common understanding of meaning?
Technical Understanding – Did the opinion use technical understanding of meaning?
Whole Act – Did the opinion invoke the whole act rule?
Absurdity – Did the opinion find an interpretation of text to be absurd?
Legislative History – Did the opinion use legislative history for statutory meaning?
Conference Committee – Was the legislative history from a conference committee?
Other Committee – Was the legislative history from an non-conference committee?
Sponsor – Was the legislative history a sponsor statement?
Other – Was the legislative history some other aspect of the record (e.g., hearing)?
President – Did the opinion use a presidential statement for statutory meaning?
Post Enactment– Did the opinion use post -enactment legislative history?
Congressional Inaction – Did the opinion use congressional inaction for interpretation?
Reenactment – Did the opinion rely on a statute’s reenactment for interpretation?
Legislative Purpose – Did the opinion use legislative purpose for interpretation?
Chevron Deference – Did the opinion use Chevron deference?
Expressio – Did the opinion use the expressio canon?
Ejusdam – Did the opinion use the ejusdam canon?

Noscitur – Did the opinion use the noscitur canon?
Common Law – Did the opinion use the common law canon?
Federalism – Did the opinion use the federalism canon?
Constitutional avoidance – Did the opinion use the constitutional avoidance canon?
Lenity – Did the opinion use the rule of lenity canon?
For each of these variables, a justice vote was coded as “1” if it affirmatively used the
interpretive principle, “0” if it made no mention of the principle, and “-1” if it rejected the
use of the principle in interpretation. Rejection could take the form of either the rejection
of the validity of the interpretive standard as a general matter or the rejection of its value
in the particular case.
Decisions were also coded for case type and for the ideological direction of the opinion.
The case type codes were: (a) criminal, (b) civil rights, (c) first amendment, (d) due
process, (e) privacy, (f) labor, (g) other economic activity and regulation, (h) civil
procedure, and (i) miscellaneous. Ideological coding was based on the identity of the
parties and their litigation positions. In criminal cases, a decision for the defendant was
coded as liberal and one for the government as conservative. In civil rights cases, a
decision for a minority or female was liberal, and a decision against such parties was
conservative. A decision for application of the first amendment or due process or privacy
rights was coded as liberal and the contrary was conservative. A decision for a labor
union was coded liberal and a ruling for business in a labor dispute was conservative. A
decision for government in regulation was liberal while a decision in favor of a regulated
entity was coded as conservative. A decision for a tort plaintiff was coded liberal, and a
ruling for a defendant was conservative. In cases including civil procedure disputes, a
ruling for an “underdog” was coded as liberal, where this could be readily categorized.
A few cases could not be clearly coded under these principles and were excluded. For
some other cases, the ideological coding is debatable. For example, the database
included criminal cases involving violation of a gun possession law. A decision for the
defendant in such an action was coded liberal but is arguably an ideologically
conservative decision. To avoid the risk of introducing researcher bias, though, the
traditional coding was used. To the extent that this coding was erroneous, it will tend to
understate the effect of ideology on judicial decisionmaking.
The cases were also coded by year of decision, number of justices in the majority, and
whether the justice in question was a dissenter or concurrer and whether the justice
authored the opinion containing the statutory interpretation analysis.

APPENDIX B
Descriptive Statistics
This appendix provides summary data on the cases included in the database analyzed in
this study. This data may be valuable in assessing the representativeness of the cases
analyzed and for future research. This appendix provides the necessary data on the types
of cases contained in the database, the relative frequency with which the justices
employed particular tools of statutory interpretation or affirmatively rejected those tools,
the relative number of justice-votes in each year of the database,
TABLE B1
Case Types in Database
Casetype
Criminal
Civil Rights
First Amendment
Due Process
Privacy
Labor
Economic
Civil Procedure
Miscellaneous

Frequency
25.7%
11.3%
2.5%
0.8%
0.8%
9.0%
29.0%
6.9%
13.8%

TABLE B2
Use of Statutory Interpretation Methodologies
Mean Negative Positive
Textualism
1.09
6.0%
64.2%
Legislative History .88
13.6%
56.8%
.05
7.0%
11.0%
Canons
Pragmatism
.15
9.7%
22.5%

TABLE B3
Number of Votes by Year

1994
1995
1996
1997

Frequency
13.8%
13.3%
6.6%
9.2%

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

11.8%
9.7%
11.3%
10.8%
13.5%

